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Abstract The idea that deep brain stimulation (DBS)
induces changes to personality, identity, agency, authen-
ticity, autonomy and self (PIAAAS) is so deeply
entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has be-
come an unchallenged narrative. In this article, we criti-
cally assess evidence about putative effects of DBS on
PIAAAS. We conducted a literature review of more than
1535 articles to investigate the prevalence of scientific
evidence regarding these potential DBS-induced changes.
While we observed an increase in the number of publica-
tions in theoretical neuroethics that mention putative
DBS-induced changes to patients’ postoperative
PIAAAS, we found a critical lack of primary empirical
studies corroborating these claims. Our findings strongly
suggest that the theoretical neuroethics debate on putative
effects of DBS relies on very limited empirical evidence
and is, instead, reliant on unsubstantiated speculative
assumptions probably in lieu of robust evidence. As such,
this may reflect the likelihood of a speculative neuroethics
bubble that may need to be deflated. Nevertheless, despite
the low number of first-hand primary studies and large
number of marginal and single case reports, potential
postoperative DBS changes experienced by patients re-
main a critical ethical concern. We recommend further
empirical research in order to enhance theoretical
neuroethics work in the area. In particular, we call for
the development of better instruments capable of captur-
ing potential postoperative variations of PIAAAS.
Keywords Adverse effects . Autonomy. Agency.
Assumption . Authenticity . Control group . Deep brain
stimulation . Evidence . Identity . Neuroethics .
Personality . Self
Introduction
In theoretical neuroethics, the idea that Bpersonality
changes and possible loss of personal identity can follow
from the introduction of foreign (biological or technical)
material into the brain^ [1] is pervasive and highly recur-
rent. In particular, deep brain stimulation (DBS) has been
commonly associated with such alleged changes, and
consequently, it has been a central concern in theoretical
neuroethics. Many publications suggest that when BDBS
is applied to enhancing or maintaining movement, the
specter of Phineas Gage, whose personality changed so
radically after his brain was pierced by a tamping iron,
haunts us. [DBS] may fundamentally alter selves^ [2].
Suggestions that DBSmay induce personality changes
are strongly established within theoretical neuroethics
narratives, and they are articulated in many ways. For
instance, Schechtman declares that Bpersonality changes
[following DBS] represent a threat to personal identity
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and agency^ [3]. Witt and colleagues assert that Bthe risk
of becoming another person following [DBS] surgery is
alarming^ [4]. Others argue that DBS Bpose[s] manifold
medical, philosophical and ethical questions as regards
the personality, personal identity, individual responsibili-
ty, autonomy, authenticity and self-perception of the per-
son involved^ [5]; or that DBS Bmay alter a range of
mental states critical to thought, personality and behaviour
… disrupt[ing] the integrity and continuity of the psycho-
logical properties that constitute the self and one’s expe-
rience of persisting through time as the same person^ [6];
or that DBS Bhas the potential to alter essential features of
a patient’s personhood, including mood, personality, and
cognitive abilities^ [7]., etc. These examples are a fraction
of many claims frequently published in neuroethics arti-
cles about the alleged adverse effects of DBS. In fact,
since the publication of Schüpbach et al.’s seminal work
in [8], entitled BNeurosurgery in Parkinson’s disease: A
distressed mind in a repaired body?^ [8], there has been a
substantial increase in theoretical neuroethics articles ex-
ploring the putative impacts of DBS on personality, iden-
tity, agency, autonomy, authenticity, and self (PIAAAS).
The idea that DBS induces PIAAAS changes is so deeply
entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has be-
come an unchallenged narrative. However, it comes with
some surprise that this narrative has not been rigorously
scrutinized. To our knowledge, few studies investigate the
occurrence and type of empirical evidence demonstrating
putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS.
The purpose of this study is to address this
issue. We critically examine and assess empirical
evidence about the putative effects of DBS on
patients’ PIAAAS. In particular, our main objec-
tive is to identify evidence within the neuroscien-
tific and medical literature substantiating the con-
clusion that DBS causes PIAAAS changes, which
appears to be persistently suggested in the theoret-
ical neuroethics narrative. Accordingly, this paper
targets substantial and consequential effects
impacting patients’ PIAAAS, primarily considering
deteriorative and estrangement-inducing adverse ef-
fects of DBS [9]. Our second objective is to ex-
amine the prevalence of articles discussing the
alleged effects of DBS on patients’ PIAAAS in
the theoretical neuroethics literature. Our third goal
is to assess our findings, especially, whether the
theoretical neuroethics literature is engaged in a
speculative bubble, which may need to be deflated
and rectified by grounding it in empirical evidence
as available through the scholarly neuroscientific
and medical literature.
Methods
To identify and examine the prevalence of articles
discussing putative effects of DBS on patients’ person-
ality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, and self
(PIAAAS), we searched the archives of some leading 30
bioethics journals1 and AJOB Neuroscience, as well as
relevant articles indexed in ProjectMuse, JSTOR,
PhilPapers, and PhilIndex (limiting our search to aca-
demic journals). Furthermore, we examined the preva-
lence of empirical evidence supporting links between
DBS and PIAAAS explicitly. To this purpose, we
searched for relevant articles in the databases of
PubMed, Scopus, Embase, Web of Science,
PsycAarticles, Psychology & Behavioral Sciences Col-
lection (PBSC), PsycInfo (via Ovid), and Psychiatry
Online (excluding news articles). Articles until
May 2017 were considered.
Articles were retrieved using the search terms Bdeep
brain stimulation^ AND (personality OR identity OR
autonomy OR agency OR authenticity OR self). Dupli-
cate articles were removed manually with the help of
EndNote’s BFind duplicates^ function. To determine
whether articles were mainly discussing DBS, we used
the web browser’s (Google Chrome) or Adobe Reader’s
search function to get an overview of the extent to which
the term DBS appeared in each article under review.
Articles that did not mention DBS in the abstract or did
not dedicate at least half of the text to discussing DBS
were excluded. The remaining articles—those that in-
volved ‘substantial’ discussion of DBS—were then in-
dividually examined to determine the number of times
any element of PIAAAS was mentioned as determined
through a search for (personality OR identity OR auton-
omy OR agency OR authenticity OR self) using the
browser or Adobe Reader’s Search function. The num-
ber of mentions for each search component were then
tabulated in an Excel sheet. Articles that did not mention
at all any component of PIAAAS were automatically
excluded. The abstract and/or actual text of articles that
mentioned any of these terms were examined further to
see if they really explored the effect of DBS on PIAAAS
or if these terms were just mentioned in passing. In some
1 Please refer to Annex 1 to see the full list of journals.
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cases, bioethics articles might make over 100 mentions
of the terms PIAAAS (taken collectively), while scien-
tific articles might make as little as five (or fewer) of the
same mentions (taken collectively).
Articles reporting primary studies or case studies
were identified and examined manually. We defined
primary studies as new reports of clinical cases involv-
ing first-hand interviews or clinical studies involving
implanted patients. In other words, a first-hand primary
study is a new clinical report involving at least one
patient undergoing psychometric tests or being
consulted in a clinical setting or being interviewed for
the purpose of examining potential DBS-induced
PIAAAS. Our final inclusion and exclusion criteria
were based on the evaluation of the primary study’s core
text and explicit conclusion. Articles with primary data
were identified as first-hand literature; consequently,
articles that did not directly gather PIAAAS-relevant
data from patients were not considered as valid first-
hand evidence. Articles not reporting novel empirical
evidence but that still discuss already published primary
empirical studies in relation to PIAAAS were manually
identified as second-hand literature. Articles that discuss
PIAAAS but not referring to any primary research (of a
kind that reported new empirical evidence) were manu-
ally identified as third-hand literature.
Results
In General
A total of 1535 articles were assessed. We found 64
articles that qualified as first-hand studies (See Fig. 1
BPrimary Study Articles^2). However, after assessing
these articles one by one, we found that 67% (n = 43)
do not support direct links of DBS on PIAAAS. Anal-
ysis of the remaining 21 articles revealed that 13 articles
were marginal or single case studies.3 As a result, only 8
studies qualified as significant evidence (12.5% of 64
primary research), involving 168 patients in total (see
Table 1: First Hand Primary Research).4 It is crucial to
note that none of these 8 studies had control groups.
Generally, it can be more difficult to evaluate the out-
come and attribute the cause of the observed effect when
a control group is lacking. Prospective, randomized, and
sham-controlled trials, for example, represent particu-
larly neat study designs to investigate effects of DBS.
Strikingly, when a control group was included as part of
the experimental procedure, for example in Schüpbach
et al. [18], the control group, which did not receive
stimulation, experienced more severe adverse effects
related to PIAAAS than the actual group that received
stimulation.
We observed a contrast between the number of pub-
lications in theoretical neuroethics and the number of
published primary research articles (see Fig. 2). A sub-
stantial increase in publication in theoretical neuroethics
appears to occur starting in 2009.
In Particular
1) Conclusions of studies not matching neuroethics
claims
When assessing the strength of evidence referred to
in the theoretical neuroethics literature, we observed that
the most cited articles in Table 15 are three seminal
manuscripts published by Schüpbach et al. [8], Agid
et al. [11] and Houeto et al. [10]. Interestingly, the
articles by Schüpbach et al. [8] and Agid et al. [11] are
two distinct versions of the same French trial study,
based on the same interviews, involving the same 29
2 Primary study articles explicitly naming PIAAAS in their published
work.
3 By marginal reports, we understand case reports not well detailed.
Marginal reports mention some events in articles, nothing more. For
instance, most articles marginally report Bout of 27 patients implanted,
1 patient experienced hyper-sexuality following surgery^ without pro-
viding more details. From marginal reports, it is difficult to derive
causation, in particular also impossible to exclude co-variables. Hence,
by marginal reports we include anecdotal reports, single-patient case
reports.
4 Involving 168 patients in total, but not all 168 patients’ experiences
would qualify as evidence for a link between DBS and PIAAAS
changes. Even if marginal and case reports were included in our final
total, it would not significantly change the prevalence (see our Discus-
sion). To our knowledge, the most cited case report in neuroethics is the
one by Leentjens et al. [17]. Unfortunately, most marginal and case
reports in the literature are not like Leentjens et al. [17]. The report of
Leentjens et al. is a unique example where clinicians were turning off/
on the stimulation and were able to directly and instantaneously ob-
serve behavioral changes occurring (accordingly, they were capable of
excluding some variables as contributing to these changes). But if we
include the Leentjens et al.’s single case report in our final count, we
have to include all the marginal case reports. Most marginal reports
strictly mention events in articles, without providing much details or
excluding co-variables. Including marginal case reports would be
including occurrences where essential details about the cause of the
observed changes are missing.
5 As reported by Google Scholar citation metrics
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patients. Despite being referenced, cited, and discussed
in theoretical neuroethics as empirical evidence demon-
strating the effects of DBS on PIAAAS, both articles do
not support this conclusion. Agid et al. [11] concluded:
It seems more likely that the difficulty in social
integration experienced by our operated patients
resulted, not directly from a modification of the
patients’ personality, but rather indirectly from a
difficulty of reintegrating into the socio-familial
and professional environment [11].
At the same time, Schüpbach et al. [8] concluded:
it was shown that [DBS] led to an overall im-
provement in mood, anxiety, and quality of life.
Now, in spite of the excellent motor outcome, it is
clear that the operation can result in poor adjust-
ment of the patient to his or her personal, family,
and socio-professional life. Whether this is a pure-
ly reactive response to a new situation or whether
it is caused by an effect of STN stimulation on
behavior, or both, remains to be elucidated. [8]
An article published later by Schüpbach et al. [18]
that included a group of people with Parkinson’s disease
(PD) treated with DBS and a matched control group not
treated with DBS (both groups with a follow-up period
of 2 years), found that the control group experienced a
higher rate of psychiatric adverse effects related to
PIAAAS compared to the group treated with DBS.
On their side, Houeto et al. [10] reported 8 patients
(out of 24) who experienced changes related to PIAAAS
following DBS implantation, but they observed that
postoperative Bpsychiatric disorders consisted of ampli-
fication or decompensation of previously existing dis-
orders that had sometimes passed unnoticed^ before
implantation [10]. In other words, DBS did not initiate
the onset of postoperative psychiatric disorders; rather,
patients were already suffering from these disorders
prior to implantation. Put simply, Parkinson’s disease
symptoms may have ‘masked’ psychiatric symptoms;
DBS helped keep Parkinson’s disease symptoms under
control, with the decompensation and manifestation of
psychiatric symptoms as an unintended adverse effect.
2) Conceptual discussions based on few quotes.
Given the scarce evidence, as reported above, many
neuroethicists and philosophers selected specific quotes
from BSchüpbach et al. [8]^ or BAgid et al. [11]^ to
introduce, support, and illustrate their philosophical ap-
proach regarding the link of DBS to changes of im-
planted patients’ PIAAAS. One of the most fascinating
quotes used by conceptual neuroethicists is the reported
experience of an implanted female French patient who
declared after surgery: BI feel like an electric doll^ [8].
Surprisingly, we found that this specific quote was not
accurately translated in Agid et al. [11], where the
patients’ statement appeared as: BI’m an electric doll^
[11]. We would like to highlight the importance of these
semantic points because establishing a philosophical
theory on a few selective quotes, particularly when
words such as BI feel^ or BI am^ largely differ in their
meaning, does not represent robust evidence.
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This highlight the importance of not just basing
theroetical arguments on some selective quotes. In
addition, one would think that such nuances do
make a differences in the theroetical discourse, even
though, the error for disseminating a wrong transla-
tion was not on the part of neuroethicists, in this
case. However, such a discrepancy in translation
suggests that we (neuroethicists) should look more
carefully from where these quotes are taken from
and how they are being used (purportedly) as evi-
dence within our work. Ontologically speaking, one
could strongly question and dispute a philosophical
conclusion based on the sentence BI feel like an
electric doll^, as it might not entail the same philo-
sophical view as the quote, BI’m an electric doll^
(while the latter quote may involve a psychotic
(delusional) episode, the former could simply repre-
sent a playful and moody remark). Importantly, this
also means that professional interviewers have a
duty to try identifying what the interviewees mean
when verbalizing such statements, and more impor-
tantly, translations should be identical across differ-
ent publications and should faithfully capture the
verbal expressions voiced by patients, along with
providing a description of the context in which these
expressions were made. As well, this highlights that
philosophers quoting these first-hand studies may
need to provide more than just fragments of the
quote, preferably include a longer tract of quoted
text that better reveals the patients intended mean-
ing, and mention the context as well, especially if
this was reported or described in the primary study.
3) Postoperative outcomes related to pathology rather
than technology
As indicated in Houeto et al.’s conclusion [10], a
neurodegenerative disease such a Parkinson’s disease
may entail psychiatric symptoms due to advancement
of the degenerative process, a phenomenon that does
not necessarily translate to other diseases, such as
dystonia. Based on (still scarce) qualitative research
outcomes, it could be suggested that postoperative
adverse effects on PIAAAS are more related to dis-
ease progression rather than to DBS itself. For in-
stance, interviews conducted by Hariz et al. [19],
capturing subjective experiences of 30 patients im-
planted with DBS for treating their dystonia, reveal
that, overall, patients felt they Bstill [were] the same
person inside, but with new abilities and another
physical appearance, [which] was difficult to compre-
hend and come to terms with^. 12 As an example,
Hariz et al. [19] quoted a patient reporting: BNow,
even though I have been given a new body I haven’t
been given a new mind. It’s like plastic surgery, you
might change your nose but how you feel about your-
self is still the same^ [19]. Elsewhere, de Haan et al.
[14], after interviewing 18 OCD patients implanted
with DBS, concluded that: BApart from the previously
documented improvement of mood, diminishment of
anxiety, and increase of impulsivity, we also found
changes such as an increase in trust, self-reliance, and
self-confidence, a more unreflective mode of engage-
ment, and a more careless stance on things^ [14]. Our
review found that when the putative effects of DBS on
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PIAAAS are raised by theoretical neuroethicists, most
authors do not distinguish diseases and stimulation
parameters —most generalize their conclusions
concerning the putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS
of patients being treated for Parkinson’s disease to
how they understand the effects of DBS on PIAAS
for patients with other conditions and potentially, with
leads implanted in other brain regions or with differ-
ent stimulation parameters. The presumption here is
that all patients suffering from different presenting
neurological conditions and stimulated in different
brain regions and with differing parameters would
react in the exact same way to treatment. For example,
Nyholm and O’Neill [20] in their conceptual study
about the effects of DBS on treatment-refractory an-
orexia nervosa individuals selected cases from differ-
ent patients implanted with DBS targeting distinct
pathologies: for instance, Parkinson’s and OCD. Our
findings show that there is no evidence pointing to-
ward an identical treatment reaction for DBS targeting
different neurological conditions. Although we do not
say that unintended effects of DBS can be excluded
per se, we aim to highlight that theoretical neuroethics
publications should always acknowledge that DBS is
not a monolithic technology and that the region and
parameters of stimulation interact with the pathophys-
iology of the disorder, all of which contribute to the
overall effect of the surgery and stimulation.
4) Assumptions
We discovered some commonly accepted as-
sumptions among conceptual neuroethicists and
philosophers, particularly in third-hand literature.
Assumptions include claims without any corrobo-
rating empirical evidence. In those cases, manu-
scripts discuss putative impacts of DBS on
PIAAAS without referring to first-hand primary
research. For instance, in order to support the hy-
pothesis that implantable devices are a philosophi-
cal and ethical problem, Schermer [21] quotes
Hasson’s view that brain implants may be a Breason
to reconsider our criteria for personal identity and
personality changes^ [1]. It is essential to note that
Hasson’s conceptual paper does not refer at all to
any first-hand primary research. Elsewhere,
Johansson et al. advance the claim that, B[p]otential
alterations of personality seem […] to be relevant
for most DBS indications^ [22]. It is important to
note that these same authors, in other important
works, refer to first-hand primary research [23,
24]. However, these examples of unsubstantiated
claims—i.e. claims lacking any reference to prima-
ry research—as appearing in third-hand literature
illustrate a trend across the theoretical neuroethics
literature where authors rely on rare empirical evi-
dence to argue their case, as statements based on
lack of evidence go unchallenged. It goes without
saying that purely theoretic work is warranted and
highly valuable. Neuroethicists have more than the
freedom to reflect on PIAAAS, but it is potentially
misleading if they either bring it in connection with
empirical findings that do not corroborate their
claims.
To the best of our knowledge, the assumption that
DBS alters PIAAAS first appears to have been ex-
plicitly articulated in a scholarly publication with the
work of Gisquet [12]. Gisquet, interviewing patients
implanted with DBS, declared that her study was
Bbased on the assumption that a treatment using
biotechnical techniques is a unique disruptive expe-
rience which redefines the patient’s life^ [12]. Inci-
dentally, from the moment the assumption was for-
mulated and published in the literature in 2009 (see
Fig. 2), across all publications in neuroethics, the
prevalence of theoretical manuscripts increased,
while studies reporting empirical evidence dimin-
ished overall. Although speculation in ethics can
be a very valuable tool [25], the lack of empirical
evidence showing that DBS induces PIAAAS
changes is concerning and reflects a potential spec-
ulative ethics bubble, which might need to be
deflated.
Discussion
In general, we found that the discussion about
putative effects of DBS on patients’ PIAAAS in
theoretical debates is supported by only a small
sample of empirical evidence, which strongly sug-
gests that this discussion relies on a limited
amount of facts rather than on substantial empiri-
cal evidence. Theoretical neuroethics in the context
of DBS-related discussions about PIAAAS is
mostly reliant upon second-hand and third-hand
literature.
Deflating the BDBS causes personality changes^ bubble
There is considerable diversity in the way putative
effects of DBS on patients’ postoperative life have been
described in the literature, particularly in theoretical
neuroethics (see Table 2: Sample of philosophical ex-
planations about putative impact of DBS on PIAAAS).
These descriptions seem to serve the authors’ philosoph-
ical accounts rather than reflect first-hand primary study
conclusions. For instance, according to Kraemer [33],
Bby employing the philosophical framework of authen-
ticity and alienation, we are led to call into question the
psychological assessment of the three case studies of
Parkinson patients who underwent changes in their per-
sonalities and preferences after successful treatment
with DBS^. To support her claims, she refers to
Schüpbach et al. [8]. However, as indicated above,
Schüpbach et al. [8] do not conclude that patients’
personalities were impacted by DBS.6 Elsewhere, Witt
et al. [4] assert Bwe will begin our discussion with a few
quotes from a case reported by Schüpbach et al. It will
give us an impression of what proponents of the
Change-of-Identify Thesis presumably have in mind
when ascertaining ‘alterations in the patient’s identity .^
Here too, there seems to be a misinterpretation of the
findings of Schüpbach et al., who do not conclude
anything about how DBS impacts patient identity.7 In
a very influential paper (citation count 90 with Google
Scholar at the time of writing), Baylis affirms:
BDBS is such a threat but only insofar as it is a
threat to agency—the ability to make informed
and rational choices—as when a person’s actions
do not flow from her intentions or beliefs but
rather are the result of direct brain manipulation.
Here it is worth noting that following DBS pa-
tients not only report BI don’t feel like myself
anymore,^ and BI haven’t foundmyself again after
the operation,^ they also report BI feel like a
robot,^ and BI feel like an electric doll ^.
To support this philosophical claim, she refers to
Schüpbach et al. [8]. However, Schüpbach et al.’s [8]
article explicitly states that these quotes: BI feel like a
robot,^ and BI feel like an electric doll^ are given in the
context of discussions of Baltered body image^, not
agency. For instance, Schüpbach et al.’s [8] manuscript
states: B1) Altered body image: Only 6 patients (20%)
thought about the implanted material in terms of body
image and formed a mental representation of the stimu-
lator and the electrodes.^ Schüpbach et al.’s [8] do not
suggest anything about how DBS might alter patients’
deliberation, decision-making or agency. Our goal here
is not to single out each relevant claim made in the
philosophical and theoretical neuroethics literature and
to check whether it is supported by empirical evidence.
After all, part of the important mission of philosophy
and theoretical neuroethics, as seen in the great concep-
tual work of Baylis and others cited above, is to specu-
late about concepts and to indulge in thoughtful enquiry,
not necessarily trying to ground them in empirical facts.
Instead, our goal is to stress that Table 2 represents a
sample of some of the philosophical speculations about
the putative impacts of DBS on PIAAAS, which appear
not to accurately reflect the conclusions made by the
first-hand primary studies.
Out of 64 first-hand primary studies, 43 did not cor-
roborate evidence that DBS leads to PIAAAS alteration.
Out of the remaining 21 articles, 13 were marginal or
single reports. By virtue of the fact that marginal or
single observations do not constitute robust data leading
to definitive scientific conclusions, our study indicates
that the theoretical neuroethics literature may rely on
unsubstantiated speculative assumptions in lieu of robust
evidence. Marginal or single findings are discounted
because they are mostly reported without any objective
measurement and may not include extensive medical
information, which make these studies difficult to repli-
cate and compare with other studies. In addition, they do
not provide the actual incidence of DBS-induced
PIAAAS in a particular cohort of individuals that re-
ceived DBS for a particular disorder in that institution.
In general, to establish cause-and-effect relationships,
study subjects, for example, can be divided into experi-
mental and control groups. Therefore, double blind ran-
domized controlled trials (RCT’s) are considered one
form of study design (besides e.g. longitudinal and time
series studies) for establishing such relationships [40]. In
RCT’s, differences in outcomes are attributable to differ-
ent treatments received in such between-group designs
because the distribution of confounders is balanced
across experimental conditions by design [41]. In com-
parison to control-group designs, case-studies are often
characterized by poor internal validity due to the fact that
there is nothing to compare the result to. As a final
addition, in principle, studies and reviews investigating
6 Not only Schüpbach et al. do not conclude this, they exclude person-
alities as an explanation in their Agid et al. [11] version. See our section
BConclusions of studies not matching neuroethics claims^.
7 In addition, the concept of identity is not alluded to nor is used once
in this published study.
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effects on PIAAAS should differentiate between active
and inactive control groups because there is a difference
in the kind of effect estimates that are obtained [42].8 It is
essential to stress that these observations do not lead to
the conclusion that case study designs are less valuable
than RCTs in all respects.
According to a Global Deep Brain Stimulation De-
vices Industry report, in 2018, 21 companies are
commercialising DBS worldwide9; Medtronic accounts
for 150,000 implanted patients alone [44]. As such,
accounting for the exact number of patients implanted
with all different commercialized DBS devices world-
wide is difficult to guess, but 150,000 is clearly an
underestimation. Given the high number of patients
8 This observation does not mean that for establishing causal relation-
ships, there has to be a control group installed; having control groups is
one example of good experimental design in order to compare effects.
However, with regard to interventional DBS studies on cognitive
changes, a recent review outlined that the majority of such studies is
actually under-powered thereby affecting the inferences that can be
drawn from such results (i.e. studies lacked statistical power even for
large effect sizes and therefore are associated with an increased type II
error risk [43]) Effect size refers to a standardized measure that quan-
tifies the size of the difference between two groups or the strength of
association between two variables (i.e. the magnitude of the effect). It
goes without saying that studies on the presumed effects of DBS on
PIAAAS should also be adequately powered. We are aware of the fact
that recruiting age-, medication- and disease-matched controls and
adherence to robust study designs are often practically difficult. A
more detailed discussion on study designs (including, for example,
interventional pre-post analyses), however, is beyond the scope of this
article
9 These companies include Boston Scientific Corp., Abbott Laborato-
ries, Aleva Neurotherapeutics SA, Deep Brain Innovations LLC, Bei-
jing Pins Medical Co. Ltd., etc. They are commercialising and
manufacturing their devices across US, Canada, Japan, Europe, Asia-
Paficic, Latin America. Please refer to https://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/global-deep-brain-stimulation-devices-industry-
300594349.html Last retrieved May 06 2018.
Table 2 Sample of philosophical explanation about DBS putative impact on PIAAAS
Discussed by DBS impacts characterised by
Gisquet [12] Changes in personality and loss of control over one’s life and illness
Synofzik & Schlaepfer [26] The ‘level’ and ‘extent’ of changes to naturalistic notion of personality
Focquaert & De Ridder [27] Changes in personality and self-perception
Glannon [6] Changes in thought and personality
Schechtman [3] Narrative identity and agency/disruption of the narrative flow
Klaming and Haselager [28] Disruptions of psychological continuity impact on patient competence
and responsibility
Johansson et al. [22] Personality changes and impacts on authenticity
Schermer [23] Balancing risks and benefits and respect for autonomy and responsibility
Baylis [29] Disruption of the balance between how a person sees and understands
herself with how others see and understand her
Nir & Walter [30] Personal identity and a sense of free agency (identification)
De Haan et al. [13] Patients experience a richer field of affordances and act more flexible on
these new affordances
Witt et al. [4] Patients’ core attitudes
Gilbert [31, 32] Self-estrangement, loss of control and powerlessness.
Kraemer [33] Felt-Authenticity and felt-Alienation
Mecacci & Haselager [34] Psychological maladaptations and conceptual schemes concerning the
relationship between mind and brain
Dings & de Bruin [35] Aspects of the self – embodied, experiential, affective, intersubjective,
psychological/cognitive, narrative, extended and situated
Maslen, Pugh & Savulescu [36] DBS can potentially affect authenticity of the patient’s choice.
Mackenzie & Walker [37] Autonomy, competence
Nyholm & O’Neill [38] DBS can bring about a patient’s Btrue self^: best version or the best part(s)
of a person as valued from the point of view of the patient or from the point
of view of a third party (e.g. the family).
Goddard [39] The impacts of DBS must pay account to the interrelation of identity or agency or autonomy
Deflating the BDBS causes personality changes^ bubble
implanted with DBS, the number of reported (putative)
DBS-induced PIAAAS changes appear to be extremely
low. Cumulatively, our study found that there were only
168 patients interviewed across the 8 first-hand primary
studies. Even if we were to include the 13 marginal and
case reports we found, it would not significantly change
the prevalence of evidence.10
The putative effects of DBS on patients’ PIAAAS has
probably been inflated in several ways. First, there is the
problem of scarce data given that a large proportion of the
published studies involve reports of only marginal or
singular cases, and it is not possible to derive conclusions
from this basis for explaining the phenomenology of
DBS. For instance, a scholar who has read reports of
marginal findings that some patients experience mood
changes following DBS implantation might extrapolate
that these mood changes are evidence of postoperative
PIAAAS changes, even though mood changes are not
sufficient to the ascription of DBS induced changes on
PIAAAS. Deriving conclusions from marginal cases
might lead to committing a post hoc ergo propter hoc-
related error [9]. The phenomenon of Bbecoming a differ-
ent person^ after DBS interventions could not be solely
attributed to the electrical stimulation itself but also to
post-operative treatment adjustments or to disease pro-
gression [47, 48]. As such, the prevalence and incidence
of effects on PIAAASmight not be exclusively correlated
with a specific DBS target and/or stimulation parameter. It
should rather be seen as a result of the interaction between
electrical stimulation, adjustments in medication, and nat-
ural progression of the disease [9 47–49], apart from
premorbid personality traits and e.g. the pre-operative
psychosocial status of the individual [47], especially when
DBS is used in patients with neurodegenerative disorders
where changes to PIAAAS are naturally inevitable re-
gardless of treatment course and choices. For instance,
although Parkinson’s disease is usually associated with
motor symptoms such as bradykinesia, rest tremor, mus-
cular rigidity, and postural instability, a large proportion of
affected individuals also exhibit cognitive impairment and
psychiatric symptoms [50]. Studies show that almost 25.2
to 40% of Parkinson’s disease patients suffer from depres-
sion, up to 43% have anxiety disturbances, 32 to 42%
exhibit apathy, 5.6 to 11.1% experience mania or hypo-
mania, 15% have symptoms of impulse control disorders
[51, 52], up to 75% complain of insomnia [53], 8 to 40%
experience psychosis [54], and asmany as 78.2% develop
dementia [55]. Some of these disorders such as depres-
sion, anxiety disorders, apathy, and cognitive impairment
might be due to the degeneration of brain structures
leading to complex brain signalling disturbances caused
by Parkinson’s disease itself [51, 56, 57], whereas others
such as mania/hypomania, impulse control disorders, and
psychosis might, to a greater degree, result from dopami-
nergic medication used to treat motor symptoms [52, 53].
Most of these disorders are associated with multiple risk
factors, and their onset and progression are determined by
a combined effect of genetic susceptibility, neural degen-
eration, neurotransmitter dysregulation, co-existing psy-
chiatric disorders, and medication dosage and regime [54,
58, 59]. Hence, changes in PIAAAS following DBS
should not only be attributed to the DBS target structure,
surgical trajectory, and stimulation parameter, but should
also take into account patient history, disease attributes,
and other forms of treatment adaptations such as
medication adjustments. At this point in time, it is
relatively difficult to isolate the cause of these post-
operative changes, though they have been associated
with DBS. Connected to this point is the concern
that no generalizable conclusions and recommenda-
tions should be drawn from such limited data.
Second, there is a fundamental problem with empir-
ically investigating effects of DBS on PIAAAS. As it
was outlined previously [47], there are currently only a
small number of scales that are trying to measure
personality-related changes (for studies investigating
Bagency^ [60, 61]). Unfortunately, a number of these
scales may generate biased and/or insufficient responses
because they often refer to self-report measurements.
Moreover, a majority of them are test-psychologically
inappropriately verified (regarding all necessary mea-
surement criteria, e.g. reliability & validity) and do not
consistently take up recent insights from psychological
research (i.e. they focus on explicit-deliberate process-
ing entirely). Finally, they rarely take up responses from
third parties (e.g. spouses, relatives) that could substan-
tially contribute to our understating of undesired chang-
es following DBS interventions. Consequently, there are
currently only vague objective markers of e.g. person-
ality (gathered via e.g. the big five personality test) and
10 With or without marginal case reports, our position would be sim-
ilar: empirical evidence suggesting a link between DBS and PIAAAS
is rare. This echoes Temel et al.’s [45] metareview where they report
Bpersonality changes, hypersexuality, apathy, anxiety, and aggressive-
ness were observed in less than 0.5%^ of DBS outcomes Band only
reported in case studies^. It is crucial to note that Temel et al. [46] do
not provide specific proportion of Bpersonality changes^ within the
0.5%.
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only few studies that have investigated on the topic
(thereby generating only few data). Similar to the diffi-
culties that arise when dealing with Bpersonality^ as a
rich psychological concept, Bidentity ,^ Bagency ,^
Bauthenticity ,^ Bautonomy^ and Bself^ constitute even
more difficult concepts from an empirical perspective.
Representing multifaceted and ambiguous constructs,
these terms are far from ideal for an empirical investi-
gation because operationalization is difficult. Whilst
there are numerous studies focusing on various subsets
of what could be termed Bpersonality ,^ such as cognitive
deterioration and changes in mood, to name a few, some
of the terms related to PIAAAS seem not particularly
suited for quantitative inquiries.11 Because it is a vital
prerequisite of empirical studies to generate concise
research questions on clearly identifiable markers to
meet common methodological quality criteria, it is like-
ly that concepts such as Bauthenticity^ and the Bself^
will probably remain for some time in the philosophical
rather than in the empirical domain. This is not to say
that with time, no better measures of PIAAAS will be
developed and that investigating subsets of the latter
relating to e.g. changes of affect can and will contribute
to our understanding of more qualitative concepts. Also,
this does not imply that ethical analysis only makes
sense when neuroscience gets in that stage of complete
operationalization of psychological concepts.
Neuroethicists do not have to wait for neuroscience to
be finished before they can contemplate on its ethical
implications [28]. We are also not trying to suggest that
neuroethicists can base their work only in response to
neuroscientific empirical work. However, it is currently
difficult to assess the degree of change to patients’
PIAAAS after DBS implantation given the scarcity of
instruments to objectively assess changes of PIAAAS.
Consistent with what has been said in the previous
paragraph, our third point regarding the inflation of
putative effects of DBS on patient PIAAAS takes up
methodological prerequisites (mostly stemming from
sociology) of qualitative research. Briefly, whilst single
quotes of patients can be illustrative, they need to be
treated with caution. Convergence of responses
representing saturation of the data should be in place
before generalizing the outcome(s). Needless to say,
qualitative studies should disclose the methodological
details to allow interested readers to understand them.
Finally, the concept of Bunderstanding^ in qualitative
research is a decisive issue that should be reviewed
during the process of interviewing, analysing, and writ-
ing. Patient experiences and narratives, which should
unquestionably be heard, bring fundamental knowledge
to our comprehension of postoperative changes in the
context of DBS. However, marginal or single case re-
ports, do not inform us of the actual incidence of DBS-
induced effects on the PIAAAS in a particular popula-
tion of patients treated with DBS. In some cases, mar-
ginal or single case reports could even bend the focus
in the second- and third-hand literature about chang-
es to patient PIAAAS that, although warranting im-
portant medical and ethical consideration, could in-
flate potential adverse effects, way beyond what
would be observed if a systematic study was con-
ducted. Although, subjective narratives may allow to
understand some aspects of the potential phenome-
non of DBS-induced PIAAAS [9, 63] and some
critical ethical issues, quantitative empirical studies
with strong research-designs constitute an appropri-
ate tool to investigate causal effects and to inform us
about the incidence of a given variable following a
certain treatment.
Finally, some have made the claim that the DBS
literature does not address or publish enough negative
outcomes [64–66]. If this is the case, then it would mean
that the limited amount of evidence of DBS effects on
patient PIAAAS may be due to lack of negative reports.
In that respect, it is important to consider whether most
studies have been designed to include all dimensions of
DBS’s potential side effects. Should study designs ne-
glect inclusion of subjective reports, then a lack of
evidence would not be evidence of a lack; it would
simply reflect that studies are not designed to capture
all aspects of a potential phenomenon. Concomitantly,
there is also a possibility that some patients do not report
their subjective experiences. Hariz and Hamberg have
observed that most implanted patients considered their
side effects to be the trade-off between getting treatment
and having control of the symptoms enabling them to be
more active in day-to-day life while incurring with post-
operative slurred speech or balance problems [67]. As
well, there are no objective means of deciding when a
treatment has to be considered a failure or a success
[68]. Although scales and measures that can assess
improvement or deterioration in certain symptoms of
11 Providing evidence for empirical (correlative or causal) relations
between DBS and PIAAAS might be beyond the ability of qualitative
research: BPhenomenological approach cannot establish statistical re-
lationships, because it is concerned with uniqueness and individuality,
rather than numbers and statistics^ [62].
Deflating the BDBS causes personality changes^ bubble
neurological and psychiatric disorders exist, it is to some
extent up to the patient and/or family members to decide
whether the treatment is a success or not, likely on how
benefits outweigh side-effects and whether they are in
line with the patient’s and family members’ needs and
expectations. It is also important to highlight that what
can be deemed successful from a patient’s perspective
might not necessarily be deemed successful by the fam-
ily. Although both the patient and family members
might see relief from motor symptoms, a patient might
not see potential treatment-associated hypomania as
much of a nuisance as his or her family members would.
This highlights that although PIAAAS changes might
occur, they should not necessarily be seen as a treatment
failure, automatically regarded as something completely
negative, or viewed as a trade-off that a patient should
not make.
Limitations of the study
A possible limitation of the study, even though simulta-
neously strengthening our primary claim, can be found
in the practice of selectively searching for PIAAAS in
the empirical literature. On the on hand, if instead of
only searching for DBS, we had searched (more broad-
ly) with terms such as neurotechnologies, brain im-
plants, neural devices, etc., then we would have found
a greater number of theoretical articles. On the other
hand, as outlined previously, PIAAAS are philosophical
concepts that are inherently non-scientific. Even though
empirical investigations using the concepts of
Bpersonality^ and Bagency^ do exist, they often do not
fully capture the philosophical essence of these terms.
For instance, autonomy is sometimes medically defined,
especially in the Parkinson’s literature, as the ability to
perform a particular set of actions associated with daily
living [69]; by comparison, the concept is portrayed
more broadly in the philosophical literature. In most
neuroethics and bioethics publications, the conditions
for autonomy include (1) intentions (volitions), (2) com-
petence (capacity to appreciate right and wrong and
determine oneself accordingly), (3) absence of external
controlling influences (freedom from external forces),
and (4) absence of internal controlling influences (free-
dom from internal coercive influences) [70, 71]. There-
fore, it is obvious that our sample of the empirical
literature on PIAAAS in a wider sense is too conserva-
tive. The search terminologies we used, which are main-
ly based on philosophical discourse, might not have
fully captured the extent of PIAAAS-associated key
words and terms as used in medical databases. Accord-
ingly, a large number of studies were lost due to the
rather narrowly defined search string. However, since
the vast majority of the theoretical neuroethics literature
refer to PIAAAS specifically—concepts that have weak
empirical grounding—corroborates our claim that
neuroethics is in danger of discussing PIAAAS-related
problems without a rigorous empirical foundation; as a
consequence, buying into speculative ethics. This does
not mean that we neuroethicists are not allowed to take
anecdotal findings in order to make a more general (thus
speculative) philosophical point. However, we should
accept that by not explicitly stating the weak empirical
grounding of our claims, we increase the risk of inflating
an empirically impenetrable speculative bubble and
even more pressingly, disseminating information that
might detrimentally affect the decision making of some
prospective patients and their relatives who would ben-
efit from treatment. Again, we are not advocating that
philosophers should restrain from engaging in philo-
sophically interesting theoretical reasoning stimulated
by an anecdotal incident or that potential postoperative
DBS changes experienced by patients are not critical
ethical concern despite the low number of first-hand
primary studies and large number of marginal and single
case reports. Whether and in which cases philosophy
should be based on empirical data, albeit an intriguing
question, is not within the scope of this work. Although
it is important to acknowledge the occurrence of these
potential DBS-induced PIAAAS changes and to devise
measures to adequately address them, they must also be
viewed in light of incidence rates in order to better
inform patients, family members, and caregivers of ac-
tual risk probabilities associated with this surgical inter-
vention. Unquestionably, the measurement problem of
complex changes such as PIAAAS makes the assess-
ment of incidence rates extremely difficult, and in some
cases, perhaps even impossible.
Conclusion
We have argued that there is a critical lack of primary
empirical studies corroborating potential DBS-induced
effects on patients’ postoperative PIAAAS. We have
observed a disproportionate relationship between what
is available in terms of supporting empirical evidence
and the number of theoretical interpretations and
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assumptions canvassed by neuroethicists despite the
thinness of any empirical backing of their claims
concerning the impact of DBS on patient PIAAAS. To
our view, this is reflective of a speculative neuroethics
bubble, which may need to be deflated. Occurences of
Bethics hype^ and Bspeculative ethics^ are also dis-
cusses in other domains of ELSI literatures [72–76].
While we support the view that theoretical
neuroethics is as an important field of research, we
question the robustness of building philosophical ac-
counts on limited empirical evidence (often only with
very selective quotes of patient self-reports). Given the
current state of the neuroethics literature as analysed in
this study, most claims by neuroethicists concerning the
effects of postoperative DBS PIAAAS-related changes
are made up of conclusions derived from first-hand
primary studies that do not include control groups, or
from anecdotal reports, thereby risking that the stories
seem to be ‘cherry picked’. Even if a large proportion of
the published theoretical neuroethics manuscript ap-
pears to be supported by scarce data from which it is
not possible to derive conclusions, potential postopera-
tive DBS changes experienced by patients remain a
critical ethical concern. Neuroethicists play a crucial
role in addressing concerns of stakeholders (including
patients and the general public) and improving philo-
sophical understanding of such concepts.
However, there is a pressing and urgent need to
examine the question of the effects of DBS on
PIAAAS with Bfresh^ evidence. Publishing more
first-hand primary studies can only enhance the re-
liability, robustness, and validity of the discipline.
Epistemological and methodological challenges can
be overcome by developing instruments to measure
potential changes in PIAAAS. Hence, we recom-
mend facilitating the development of instruments
that will become an international standard for cap-
turing postoperative variations in patient experience
of post operative changes to PIAAAS. Responsibil-
ity to study further this question should also be
taken by relevant stakeholders from the device in-
dustry, including device companies. To avoid risks
of conflicts of interest(s), the stakeholder should
provide necessary financial support to independent
institutions to develop study protocols that will in-
vestigate more extensively issues related to DBS-
associated impacts on patients’ PIAAAS.
Reading that Bthe risk of becoming another person
following surgery is alarming^ [4] and that Bpersonality
changes represent a threat to personal identity and
agency^ [3] is not without consequence; particularly
for prospective patients (and families) who could imme-
diately and directly benefit from the intervention. These
neuroethical assertions come with risks: they may per-
petuate and propagate misleading assumptions that lack
strong supportive scientific evidence. Ethics that pro-
pounds such unfounded speculation may seem to en-
courage the public, but most importantly prospective
patients, to adopt a reluctant approach to treatment [-
25]. However, despite the empirical limitations, we be-
lieve investigating further these issues help patients to
be informed about the potential risks of psychiatric
adverse events, possible changes in personality, and
other treatment-associated changes at hand. Neuroethics
has a fundamental responsibility to play in articulating
risks about the putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS,
hence more research and funding are needed. Nonethe-
less, we, the neuroethicists, should also keep inmind our
responsibility to properly inform our readers (potential-
ly, prospective patients) of actual risks, acknowledging
that our views are more than likely based on limited case
reports. We should also work to ensure that patients and
their family members are neither hyped up by overly
positive depictions of DBS (notably by media), nor
turned down by hyperinflated assumptions about the
involved associated risks. The media account for bigger
responsibilities in how the effects of DBS are portrayed
to the public. Neuroscientists should receive appropriate
media training so as to critically and effectively counter
stories involving hype, unrealistic and inflated sensa-
tionalistic portrayals of DBS [77].
A lack of evidence of putative effects of DBS on
PIAAAS is not evidence that there is no link; em-
pirical studies are most likely not designed to cap-
ture all aspects of potential DBS-induced PIAAAS
phenomena. What remains unclear is whether it is
all DBS-implanted patients who are at risk of post-
operative PIAAAS sequelae. Further neuroethical
research is needed more than ever, especially in a
context where novel generation of DBS systems
including closed-loop, artificially intelligent im-
plants, and brain-computer interfaces are being de-
veloped. [78–85] Whether or not these emerging
neurotechnologies will affect PIAAAS is still un-
charted territory.
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Annex 1: Search Methods Employed
I. We searched the top 30 bioethics journals (according
to a list provided by bioethics.net) and AJOB
Neuroscience.
Name of journals:
Am J Bioethics (The American Journal of Bioethics)
Dev World Bioeth (Developing World Bioethics)
Hastings Cent Rep (Hastings Center Report)
Ethnic Health (Ethnicity & Health)
J Med Ethics (Journal of Medical Ethics)
BMC Med Ethics (Biomed central Medical Ethics)
Bioethics
Neuroethics-Neth
J Empir Res Hum Res (Journal of Empirical Re-
search on Human Research Ethics)
Public Health Eth-UK (Public Health Ethics)
J Law Med Ethics (The Journal of Law, Medicine &
Ethics)
Account Res (Accountability in Research)
J Bioethic Inq (Journal of Bioethical Inquiry)
Med Law Rev. (Medical Law Review)
Rev. Rom Bioet (Revista Romana de Bioetica)
Genet Counsel (Journal of Genetic Counseling)
Ethik Med (Ethik in der Medizin)
Acta Bioeth (Acta bioethica)
Nursing Ethics
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
Nanoethics
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
The Journal of Clinical Ethics
HEC Forum
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
American Journal of Bioethics Primary Research
Indian Journal of Medical Ethics
Asian Bioethics Review
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to
Bioethics
AJOB Neuroscience.
II. Philosophy databases
Search until May 2, 2017
ProjectMuse
JSTOR
PhilPapers
PhilIndex (linmited search to academic journals)
III. Scientific, psychology, and psychiatry databases
combined
Search until May 3, 2017
PubMed - 208 results
Scopus - 236 results
Embase (via Ovid) - 263 results
Web of Science - 157 results
PsycAarticles - 17 results
Psychology & Behavioral Sciences Collection
(PBSC) - 16 results
PsycInfo (via Ovid) - 122 results
Psychiatry Online - 139 results (excluded news
articles)
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